Bureaucracy proposed to overcome Kenyan obstacles
President Obama’s multi-billion-dollar “Power Africa” initiative aims to double citizen access to electricity and other power sources across Sub-Saharan Africa. But it plays down the creation of a new public-private bureaucracy needed to overcome the pervasive corruption and incompetence of African governments and power utilities.
A significant portion of the Kenya-based endeavor is designed simply to administer the program. Segments include efforts to sway public and congressional opinion in favor of the initiative, according to a new planning document U.S. Trade & Aid Monitor located through routine database research.
The U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, will hire a contractor or contractors primarily to persuade African officials to change regulatory governance of power distribution, explains the draft Statement of Work, or SOW. A corresponding agency goal is to encourage, with contractor assistance, the escalation of private-sector investment in the region.
This regulatory and institutional strengthening and “early stage project support” will comprise 20 percent of USAID contractor efforts.
The USAID chief of party, or COP, and deputy COP, “who will be the overall managers of the contracts,” will reserve 10 percent of program funding for those government managerial functions, the document says.
The project’s overarching goal “is to remove the power constraint to economic growth and spur trade and investment, while mitigating long-term greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trajectories,” the draft SOW says. “Power Africa will serve as a catalyst that will spark a transformation in Africa’s energy and power sectors.
“The immediate outcome will be increased supply of and access to reliable, affordable, and sustainable power for millions of Africans and the enhanced responsible and transparent management of energy resources.”
Put in simpler terms, despite Obama’s ambitious and confident proclamations about the endeavor during his recent Africa trip, the document simultaneously affirms his vision and acknowledges the great difficulties the U.S. faces in executing such reforms.
Among other factors, the weak regulatory, policy and legal environments – made worse by continent-wide “corrupt and non-transparent bidding and contractual procedures” – serve as constraints to the sort of international investment Obama wants to bring about, the SOW says.
Political instability, a lengthy history of state-owned utilities and the “fear of change and competition” likewise deter private sector project-development and investment.
Consequently, the Obama administration expects U.S. taxpayers over the next five years to commit $7 billion toward stabilizing and correcting the investment roadblocks.
Whereas USAID will provide $285 million in technical assistance to remedy what it admits are typically corrupt and often incompetent governmental bodies and utility providers, the administration will direct the remainder of the funds through other U.S. agencies.
Among the entities are the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the U.S. Trade & Development Agency – entities that the Cato Institute says should be “terminated” because they largely serve as monumental vehicles of “corporate welfare waste.”
Reminiscent of a prior scheme to sway journalists into providing favorable coverage of its Kenyan aid program – a document for which the agency abruptly blocked public access following this writer's coverage of the matter – the USAID prime contractor also must provide communications and outreach support that will be “directed at the American public, U.S. Congress” and elsewhere, the draft SOW says.
The previous communications plan spelled out in greater detail how the Obama administration sought to target specific journalists and media groups from whom it sought favors.
USAID designed the earlier “strategic plan” specifically for Kenyan aid programs, which had grown so large that the agency solicited more contractors to support projects already under way through other vendors.
The agency kept the program quiet for a year before repackaging it with decreased emphasis, according to publicly available documents, on the propaganda angle, as the Monitor recently reported.
According to the Power Africa draft SOW, the selected vendor must devote 20 percent of its efforts under the prime contract towards “institutional support” for the program coordinator’s office.
Communications and outreach activities represent just one component of institutional support, which also entails tracking and coordinating activities among “Power Africa implementers and stakeholders” such as other U.S. agencies, host country governments and non-governmental organizations, the document says.
Although USAID’s East Africa Regional Mission in Nairobi, Kenya, is home to the coordinator’s office, Power Africa also has plans for Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda.
This article originally was published via WND.com (July 23, 2012). Under agreement with the editor, rights have reverted back to the author, Steve Peacock.
U.S. Prepares for Casualties in Africa
The extrication of U.S. Special Forces injured in African military ventures soon will provide contractors with an additional revenue stream, now that the Obama administration plans to keep such vendors on stand-by, 24/7, for cross-continent airborne mobilization.
While the Pentagon’s reliance on private vendors to support international military operations is nothing new, plans to station such providers specific to such a large swath of Africa does deviate from prior procurement actions.
The Trans-Sahara Short Take-Off and Landing Airlift Support initiative will rely on outside assistance in the event that soldiers of U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa sustain traumatic medical emergencies, thereby requiring urgent transportation out of hostile zones.
Indeed, SOCOM-Africa places such urgency on its anticipated use of such Casualty Evacuation, or CASEVAC, services that, at a minimum, contractors must be capable of launching an airborne response with only a three hour notice.
The selected vendor likewise must possess the ability to be placed on heightened response and “be airborne within one hour of notification,” according a revised Performance Work Statement released April 16 that U.S. Trade & Aid Monitor located via routine database research.
Despite this urgency, the vendor securing that contract largely will engage in cargo- and personnel airlift activities, plus a limited number of air-drop missions.
The “most likely” locations for such operations are Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia, according to the U.S. Transportation Command solicitation.
Kenya, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda also fall within the Primary Operating Area, or POA, of this endeavor, the USTRANSCOM document says.
SOCOM-Africa will enable this expedited response-capability by stationing the contractor in Burkina Faso, a landlocked West African nation, it says.
A search of prior Tactical Combat Casualty Care and CASEVAC solicitations available via the FedBizOpps system shows that USSOCOM and other Department of Defense units typically and primarily seek only training and equipment.
Rather than soliciting continent-wide provision of emergency medical and flight assistance, those contracting actions generally have sought assistance to enable combatant commands to provide themselves with such medical assistance.
One USSOCOM contracting action representative of the government’s acquisition of CASEVAC “kits” and trauma-management training, for example, described a critical need for Special Operations combat forces to obtain new techniques and technology in support of “ongoing operations worldwide.”
Another Special Ops solicitation from late last year revealed a $40 million, two-year contract extension awarded to Tribalco, LLC, a Bethesda, Maryland-based maker of CASEVAC and other “soldier-survival” equipment.
USTRANSCOM did not disclose an estimated cost of the Africa-centric CASEVAC procurement.
In other U.S. military procurement actions specific to Africa:
This article originally appeared via WND April 28. Under prior agreement, rights have reverted back to the author, Steve Peacock.